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Introduction
Within the context of the continuing political and social developments that began
in January 2011 in Egypt, commentators and researchers are still debating the
factors and triggers that led to such historic upheavals. These have included the
unprecedented role of new social networks and the targeting of corruption and
political repression as well as the general disenfranchisement of young people
under the Mubarak regime. Some writers have also acknowledged the contribu-
tion of high food prices and rising wealth gaps as important economic factors.
However, research has not yet adequately linked the political and social
developments in Egypt with the underlying economic policy framework under
Mubarak.1 In fact, many commentators had lauded the economic achievements of
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many of the Middle Eastern governments, including Egypt, over the course of the
2000s. The IMF and World Bank were particularly congratulatory of Egypt’s high
growth rates and its associated adoption of liberal policies. Even when weak-
nesses in terms of economic and social outcomes have been linked to political
upheaval, the analysis has tended not to go far enough and often does not
consider the role of economic policies in particular. For example, high levels of
youth unemployment have been linked to cultural and demographic features of
Egyptian society (Ahmed, Furceri, and Guillaume 2012), rather than understood as
a result of economic policies adopted by the Mubarak regime.
The paper takes a historical perspective and considers the extent to which
Egypt’s economic policies in recent years contributed to social and political
upheaval. Given the widespread literature and debate around liberalisation
and privatisation policies in Egypt and the Middle East more generally (for an
introduction see Harik and Sullivan 1992), and for the sake of brevity, this paper
will not delve into these crucial background contextual issues. Instead the focus
here is on policies adopted subsequently, particularly in the late 1990s and
2000s and in the wake of widespread economic liberalisation under the over-
sight of the IMF and World Bank. Crucial here, is that the adoption of the earlier
liberalisation and privatisation policies, opened the door to allow the Mubarak
regime’s to adopt the subsequent policies, discussed in this article.
The paper will first outline the underlying economic situation before focus-
ing on the nature and pattern of economic growth, employment and structural
change. It will then analyse more closely the economic policy trajectory in Egypt
over the last 15 years and seek to document how three specific areas of economic
policy have helped lay the basis for ongoing social and political turmoil. In
conclusion, the paper emphasises the importance of developing an alternative
economic policy framework for Egypt.
Investigating the evidence on Egypt’s pre-crisis
economic and social performance
General trends in economic growth and poverty reduction
Prior to Egypt’s 2011 upheaval, international data have frequently been cited in
order to support Egypt’s progress in relation to growth and poverty eradication. For
example, a 2008 MDG Progress Report noted that “sustaining recent economic
growth coupled with pro-poor policies holds great promise for fast reduction of
poverty in Egypt” (Ministry of Economic Development 2008). Similarly the most
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recent IMF assessment of 2010 concluded that “World Bank estimates suggest that
strong growth during 2005–08 contributed to a 14 per cent decline in the proportion
of the population living below the (upper) poverty line in Egypt” (International
Monetary Fund 2010). However, closer investigation of the data reveals a different
reality. Figure 1 captures Egypt’s economic growth rates over the last two decades
while Table 1 is based on national information on poverty levels over time.
Economic growth was slow in the early 1990s. For example, GDP growth per capita
averaged about 1.4% during 1991–1995. The slowness of growth helps explain, no
doubt, the modest decrease in the poverty incidence in this period. Between 1996
and 2000, in contrast, the growth of GDP per capita accelerated to 3.2%, and,
correspondingly, poverty declined more rapidly – at least in urban areas.
However, the early 2000s were marked by a significant decline in economic
growth. The rate of increase in GDP per capita declined to 1.6% during 2001–
2005. During this same period, poverty began to increase in both urban and
rural areas, with a more pronounced increase evident in rural areas.
Figure 1: Nominal GDP growth in Egypt 1993–2011
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Table 1: Poverty headcount ratio using national poverty line
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Poverty headcount ratio, Urban 20.3 22.5 9.3 10.1 11.0
Poverty headcount ratio, Rural 28.6 23.3 22.1 26.8 28.9
Poverty headcount ratio, Total 25.0 22.9 16.7 19.6 21.6
Source: CAPMAS, World Bank.
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By the mid-2000s, however, economic growth was clearly accelerating.
During the 3 years of 2006–2009, the rate of increase of GDP per capita averaged
4.5%. In 2009, after the onset of the global financial crisis, per capita GDP
growth fell to 2.9% and is estimated to have been 3.2% in 2010. This recent
deceleration could help to explain the rise of poverty from 19.6% in 2005 to
21.6% in 2009, despite the earlier spurt of growth during the mid-2000s.
Nonetheless, comparing the upward trend in GDP growth over the whole
period of 2000–2009 with the corresponding rise in income poverty underscores
the likelihood of problems in the character of Egypt’s economic growth. For
example, while nominal GDP growth rates averaged 4.5% for the 4 years through
2009, such rates have evidently not served to reduce income poverty.
Furthermore, if one believes that Egypt’s income distribution, as measured by
the Gini coefficient, improved marginally over the last 10 years (World Bank
2013),2 one would expect the country’s growth to have been more equitable. Yet
income poverty has been on the rise in Egypt since 2000.3
Inequality trends do not appear to be credible if there was indeed an
increasing concentration of economic assets (Karshenas and Alami 2011, 2012;
Achcar 2013). The widespread complaints about the severity of economic inequal-
ity in Egypt, especially based on the concentration of income at the top of the
distribution, do not appear to square with some of these recent estimates. Taking
a multi-dimensional measure of inequality, as done by El-Laithy (2012), demon-
strates increasing inequities in various human dimensions. In fact, such inequal-
ities have resulted in reducing Egypt’s HDI ranking in recent years. The major
reason for this is inequalities in education (Aran and Ersado 2013).
The findings confirm that wide differences in school enrollment persist, notably at the
higher levels, and mostly based on the family’s socioeconomic background. (Aran and
Ersado 2013, 17–18)
Egypt also has one of the highest Gender Inequality Indices in the region,
indicating that the gap between men and women in Egypt remains a major
concern. A further interesting trend emerges from inequality perception surveys,
conducted by the World Bank. Comparing the surveys from 2000 and 2008
indicates that subjective aversion to inequality has intensified and for all social
groups. In other words across all income groups in Egypt, individuals perceived
greater inequality in 2008 than in 2000 (Verme 2013).
2 According to World Bank (2013) estimates, the Gini coefficient rose from 32.0 in 1990/91 to
32.8 by 2000/01 before dropping back down to 31.1 in 2008/09.
3 The distinction between urban and rural poverty is particularly problematic in the Egyptian
context largely due to issues pertaining to data collection. A recent UN Habitat study describes
such concerns in depth (UN Habitat 2011).
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Clearly, Egypt’s record on poverty reduction was moving in the wrong
direction long before the political crisis of 2011. We hope to shed some light
on why these differing trends have occurred by examining changes in the nature
of growth and employment creation.
Sectoral growth trends
Examining sectoral growth trends in Egypt can help to understand the pattern of
economic growth, not just its pace, and therefore illuminate why economic
growth has failed to generate benefits for the majority of Egyptians. As in
many emerging economies, the role of the agricultural sector has been declining
in Egypt. It has been growing slower, and its share in GDP has declined from
almost 20% in 1990 to around 13% in 2010. Industry (including the oil and gas
sector) had more rapid growth in the late 1990s than in the early 2000s. While
this sector’s rate of growth did increase during 2005–2009, this was largely
driven by the oil and gas sector. Since the mid-1990s, growth of the services
sector has been relatively stable, at around 50% of GDP (see Figure 2).
According to Figure 2, the sector which made up for the decline in agricul-
ture has been the oil and gas sector, whose share has risen from under 10% in
the 1990s to over 15% in the mid-2000s.
Figure 2: Sectoral GDP composition in Egypt (selected years)
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, http://www.mop.gov.eg/
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It seems evident that economic growth in Egypt was leaving agriculture and
rural areas behind in the 2000s. Further, even when growth was rapid during
this period, it is unclear whether it benefitted large proportions of the urban
population. In fact, given the increased role of oil and gas, a notoriously capital-
intensive industry, the picture that emerges is increasingly biased against both
rural and urban workers and the poor.
Employment and labour force trends
Looking at sectoral growth trends paints a questionable picture regarding the
Egyptian economy’s ability to create remunerative jobs and lower poverty. A
closer look at employment trends themselves can help illuminate the historical
trajectories and status quo. There have been both positive and negative demo-
graphic trends in Egypt during the 1990s and 2000s. The rate of growth of the
total population has remained relatively stable. During the period 1988–1998, it
was 2.1% while during the period 1998–2006, it was 2.0%. But the growth of the
working-age population (15–64 years of age) has been faster in both periods
(3.0% and 2.7%, respectively).
As a result, youth unemployment has remained a major challenge for Egypt.
For example, 27% of the population aged 15–24 years is formally unemployed4
(UNDP 2005; Assaad 2007, 2009). Between 1997 and 2007, the 15–25 age group
comprised 57–66% of total unemployed (see Table 2).
Table 2: Unemployment according to age in Egypt
Years 1997 2003 2007
15–25 57% 66% 63%
25–39 42% 33% 36%
40–54 1% 1% 1%
Over 60 0% 0% 0%
Source: ILO, Laborsta database.
4 The unemployment rate is often a misleading indicator of labour-market conditions in
developing countries. While it can indicate the inability of better-off workers to find employ-
ment appropriate to their education and skills, it tells us, in reality, very little about the
prospects of poorer workers.
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There has been a general mismatch between young people’s educational
achievements and the nature of the demand for workers generated by the
economy (Korshid et al. 2011). While public-sector employment has diminished,
the private sector has not grown rapidly enough to productively absorb young
workers.
Many younger workers have been thwarted in finding decent, formal-sector
jobs. The trend towards informalisation, which had increased in the 1990s,
continued during the 2000s. A major concern is that the public sector (including
both public enterprises and the government) has become unable to provide jobs
in line with the growth of the labour force. Its share of the employed fell from
39% in 1998 to 30% in 2006 (Assaad 2007). Meanwhile, the formal private sector
did little to take up the slack: its share of total employment rose from only 8% to
10% (Assaad 2007). In contrast, informal wage employment, which was growing
by 7.7% between 1998 and 2006, increased its share of total employment from
13% to 17% (Assaad 2007). In other words, the growth of employment in the
informal private sector took up some of the slack from the loss in formal public-
sector jobs (Angel-Urdinola and Semlali 2010). This is likely to be one major
reason why the acceleration in economic growth in Egypt during part of the
2000s did not translate into rising real incomes and, thus, any meaningful
reduction in poverty.
Also, the rural labour force has continued to grow more rapidly than the
urban labour force. There has been a continued rapid growth of the rural work-
ing-age population (which was growing by 2.8% during 1998–2006, according to
Assaad 2007) and an increased participation of women in the rural labour force.
This growth in the rural labour force has not been matched, unfortunately, by a
corresponding increase in economic activity and thus job creation in rural areas.
The resultant disparity between the growth of the labour force and the avail-
ability of gainful employment has been a major explanation for the continuance
of poverty in Egypt and the marked increase in widespread economic and
political discontent (Joya 2011).5
An additional problem is that most wage employment remains concentrated
in small firms. For example, nearly half of all wage employment in 2006 was in
micro-enterprises having fewer than five workers (Assaad 2007). And this seg-
ment was growing, in fact, much faster than larger firms. Most of the wage
5 Joya (2011) highlights the increase and changing nature of labour unrest in Egypt since 2006.
Protests in recent years have been in response to the privatisation of public-sector firms and the
lowering of wages and benefits for workers that have accompanied this process.
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employment in small firms is informal. In firms with fewer than 10 workers, for
example, the proportion of informal employment in the total is over 80%
(Assaad 2007).
If we examine the ILO categorisation of status in employment, we find that
between 1995 and 2006, there were no significant improvements in the Egyptian
labour market. The share of workers in wage and salaried employment rose only
marginally. In 1995, this share was 57.1%; in 2000, it was 59.9%; and by 2006, it
was 61.8%. This represented only about an 8% increase over this period
(International Labour Organization 2013).
The share of workers in “vulnerable employment” exhibited a different
pattern during this period. Own-account workers and contributing family work-
ers (often unpaid) are regarded by the ILO as constituting the vulnerably
employed. The combined share of these two classifications totalled almost
24.2% in 1998. By 2002, this share had fallen to 22.4%, with both classifications
contributing to the decrease. This trend reversed, however, between 2002 and
2006 so that the share of the vulnerably employed had risen back up to 24.8% in
2006 (International Labour Organization 2013).
As a result, there had been little change in the prevalence of vulnerable
employment in Egypt between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. These trends
appear to be consistent with the U-shaped trend of extreme income poverty,
which first decreased between 1995 and 2000 and then rose during the 2000s.
Poverty and vulnerable employment are closely associated.
Finally, a closer look at the development of real wages indicates further
worrying trends in the Egyptian labour market over the 2000s. Unsurprisingly,
real wages in agriculture remain the lowest of all the sectors in Egypt (around
two thirds of the average wage). However, more importantly, while real wages
were following a general upward trajectory up to 2000, they have since declined.
Unfortunately data are only available until 2006 by which time real wages in the
services sector had dropped by 35% from their highpoint in 2000, and wages in
agriculture had reduced by 13% over the same timeframe (International Labour
Organization 2013).
Analysing employment generation and growth in
Egypt using the Job Generation and Growth Decomposition
(JOGGS) tool
ILO data suggest that trends in sectoral employment also underwent only
modest changes between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s. For example, the
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share of the total employed who are in agriculture started out at 30.7% in
1997. Even by 2002, this share had dropped significantly, namely, to 26.9%.
However, by 2006, this share had risen back up to 30.4%, almost the same as
in 1997 (International Labour Organization 2013). Since the share of agriculture
in total GDP had dropped over this same period, the inevitable implication
is that those workers who continued to be employed in agriculture had a
lower average income per worker. Surplus labour in agriculture remains
excessive since there are few promising employment opportunities in urban
areas.
Using the World Bank’s JOGGS tool can further demonstrate important
changes in Egypt with regard to employment for the period 1995–2008.
The JOGGS tool6 is an Excel-based macro-spreadsheet, which allows users
to easily decompose growth in GDP per capita in two periods into its employ-
ment, productivity and demographic components, both at the aggregate and
sectoral levels (World Bank 2007). The interpretation of results evidently
depends on the availability and reliability of the data used. In this case the
data have been taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
2013. The main questionable aspect of the data on Egypt used here relates to the
employment and productivity data. Klau (2010) details these data concerns and
limitations.
Bearing in mind the data caveats, the JOGGS remains a useful tool for
analysing the links between economic growth and the generation of jobs and
productivity in a country such as Egypt. Specifically, the JOGGS tool allows us to
answer the following questions: (i) how is growth reflected in employment
generation and in changes in output per worker; (ii) how is growth reflected in
the sectoral pattern of growth; and (iii) what are the sources of changes in
output per worker?
As indicated above, Egypt’s GDP growth over this timeframe has been
mixed, although it has averaged 3.2% per annum. Using the JOGGS tool, this
growth can be shown to have been made up of an increase in productivity
(measured as output per worker) of 1.9% per annum, annual increases in
population of working age of 0.8% per annum, and an average annual increase
in the employment rate of 0.5%. The increase in output per worker explains
around 60% of the increase in GDP growth witnessed in Egypt. The remainder is
6 For more information regarding the JOGGS tool and examples of practical applications in
other countries, please visit: http://go.worldbank.org/461KJUVOX0.
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explained by increases to the working-age population and changes in the
employment rate.
Considering a breakdown by sectors helps demonstrate where growth
has been particularly employment intensive and where it has not. According
to the JOGGS decomposition, total employment grew by 48% over the period
1995–2008. However, due to the simultaneous rise in the working-age
population, the employment rate (measured as total persons employed as a
proportion of working-age population) actually only grew by 6% over the
whole period.
It would appear that during the period 1995–2000, the services and manu-
facturing sectors significantly drove the increase in the employment rate over
this period. However, in the period after 2000 the opposite has been the case i.e.
the drivers of any the increase in the employment rate were from the agricultural
and non-manufacturing industrial sectors. The services sector on the other hand
saw its relative importance in terms of employment generation reduce over this
later timeframe.
On the whole, average output per worker increased in Egypt over the period
1995–2008. This increase was roughly equivalent over the period 1995–2000 and
2001–2008. However, what was driving this increase was indeed quite different
for the two periods. Between 1995 and 2000, labour productivity increased
across the various sectors roughly equally. Furthermore, there was a significant
inter-sectoral shift suggesting that, on average, labour was moving from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors. In fact the agricultural sector, with the
lowest productivity, witnessed a reduction in employment share, which exerted
a positive effect on increasing productivity (see Table 3).
In the period 2001–2008, however, the only sectors in which output per
worker increased were services and to a much lesser extent, industry (both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing). Significantly, agriculture saw output
per worker decrease and the inter-sectoral shift component was negative, indi-
cating that during this time workers were, on average, moving from high-
productivity sectors to lower productivity sectors. We saw earlier that over this
timeframe employment in agriculture increased. It would therefore seem that
some of the increase in output per worker witnessed in the other sectors may
have been as a result, at least partially, of workers being forced to find employ-
ment in the lower paid agricultural sector. Over the period 2001–2008, the
employment share in agriculture increased, exerting a significant effect on
reducing productivity.
Bringing the above analysis together in Tables 3 and 4 reveals the major
distinctions between the 1995–2000 and 2001–2008 periods, in terms of growth
and employment generation.
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Evidently, over both periods, demographic changes only contributed around a
quarter of all the changes in GDP growth. The remaining three quarters are
largely explained by increases in within-sector output per worker in both periods
(see final column in both tables). The share of the working age population had a
smaller positive effect, although it is clear that in the 1995–2000 period,
Table 4: Growth decomposition. percent contribution to total growth in GDP (value added) per
capita, Egypt 2001–2008
Contribution of
within-sector
changes in output
per worker (%)
Contribution
of changes
in employment
(%)
Contributions
of inter-sectoral
shifts (%)
Total
(%)
Sectoral contributions
Agriculture −2.9 14.3 −4.6 6.8
Manufacturing 5.8 5.2 1.5 12.5
Services 52.3 −6.7 −1.7 43.9
Industry excluding
Manufacturing
4.2 6.2 2.4 12.7
Subtotals 59.4 18.9 −2.4 75.9
Demographic component – – 24.1
Total 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank 2013 data
Table 3: Growth decomposition. percent contribution to total growth in GDP (value added) per
capita, Egypt 1995–2000
Contribution of
within-sector
changes in output
per worker (%)
Contribution of
changes
in employment
(%)
Contributions of
inter-sectoral
shifts (%)
Total
(%)
Sectoral contributions
Agriculture 15.4 −23.7 13.7 5.4
Manufacturing 14.8 9.9 4.9 29.6
Services 7.6 35.4 2.6 45.6
Industry excluding
Manufacturing
12.2 −11.4 −7.0 −6.2
Subtotals 50.0 10.2 14.2 74.3
Demographic component – – 25.7
Total 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank 2013 data.
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employment in agriculture and non-manufacturing industry (oil and gas, mining
and construction) decreased (second column in Table 3) while in the post-2000
period employment in these sectors grew (second column in Table 4). Similarly,
while employment in services saw considerable growth pre-2000, employment
in this sector declined again post-2000. These observations are supported by the
final contribution to GDP growth, that of inter-sectoral shifts. In the pre-2000
period, the net effect of such moves was ultimately positive while in the post-
2000 period the net effect was negative, indicating labour movement away from
high-productivity to low-productivity employment in agriculture and industry.
The overall picture that emerges from the JOGGS exercise supports the
evidence presented so far. Overall growth in the Egyptian economy, particularly
since 2001, has not been generating jobs in the sectors which have witnessed the
highest growth. The sector with the highest average growth rates, services, has
not been able to absorb new labour market entrants. Instead, the largely stag-
nant and low-productivity agricultural sector appears to have increased its
employment contribution since 2001.
Egypt’s economic policy environment: How much
are the wrong economic policies to blame?
So far, this article has demonstrated how the Egyptian economy has failed to
provide adequate employment-enhancing and poverty-reducing growth for the
majority of Egyptians. The following section of the paper investigates the con-
tributory role of economic policies in fostering such narrow and inequitable
growth. In order to demonstrate the ways in which economic policies have
contributed to the status quo, three specific issues will be investigated: (i) the
general misplaced fiscal focus on expenditure-reduction rather than revenue-
enhancement and the lack of progressive revenue growth; (ii) the manipulation
and use of subsidies in Egypt to appease the populous instead of fostering
employment generation; (iii) the failure to adequately promote employment-
intensive investment. Taken together these three policy areas offer important
insights into how economic policy-making in Egypt over the 1990s and 2000s
contributed to the social and political tensions that erupted in 2011.
Regressive fiscal policy
Egypt’s fiscal balance recently deteriorated and in 2011 the deficit reached –10%
of GDP. This has largely been driven by small increases in expenditure following
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the global crisis and a large drop in revenue in 2011 in particular. However,
considering the pre-crisis period, Egypt has maintained fiscal balances that have
ranged from þ 4% of GDP in the early 1990s to around –4% of GDP in the mid-
2000s. However, it is clear that fiscal balances have been following a downward
trajectory since the mid-2000s. It is important to ascertain how this has occurred.
It is argued here that the focus on curbing expenditure rather than raising revenue
has hampered employment-enhancing economic growth in Egypt.
Prior to the global economic crisis, Egyptian policy-makers were aiming to
achieve a fiscal target of 3% deficit to GDP ratios by 2010/11. In light of the
global crisis, this target has been postponed and is to be reached by 2014/15
(Abdallah 2012). Instead, and in response to the global crisis, the Egyptian
government did allow for a wider fiscal deficit in the short-term. The stimulus
package covered public–private partnership7 investment in infrastructure delays
to planned reductions in fuel subsidies and lower tariffs on some imported
intermediate and capital goods. However, even according to the World Bank,
Egypt’s stimulus package can be seen as somewhat conservative. “… the stimu-
lus package of 1.5 percent of GDP (which includes public investment as well as
other categories of public spending) will not be sufficient to restore growth to
the 2008 level” (World Bank and Ministry of Finance 2009).
Looking more closely at Egypt’s revenue and expenditure performance over
the past 20 years (see Figure 3) it is evident that government expenditure has
largely stagnated over time, although it rose temporarily in 2009 to cope with the
global crisis. According to World Bank data, the increase in expenditure in 2009
was largely directed to subsidies and social benefits.8 What is particularly worrying
about such expenditure stagnation is that it has been regressive, with detrimental
outcomes regarding child health and nutrition among the poorest (Assaad et al.
2012). Compensation of state employees has remained low, and the payment for
goods and services has shrunk. Social benefits which were only counted separately
in the late 1990s were initially significant at around 2% of all spending in the early
2000s but have been eroded to 0.4% in 2011 (International Monetary Fund 2013).
7 PPPs replaced unsuccessful arrangements for partnerships with the private sector over the
1990s. In 2006 the PPP Central Unit was established with the aim of pursing partnership with
the private sector to provide a new source of investment capital and financing for infrastructure
projects, and with the secondary aim of reducing the government’s fiscal burden. However, the
success of such projects remains to be seen, given concerns over terms and the potential risks
the Egyptian government could be left with (Hussein 2012).
8 We will discuss this further below. However, the increase in spending in subsidies since 2008
can be seen as a wider shift away from government spending in productive capacity-enhancing
areas and towards subsidies and welfare support. See UNCTAD (2006) for an argument in favour
of productive government spending for job creation, growth and poverty reduction.
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The government’s spending on education has also shrunk in real terms, accord-
ing to World Bank (2013) data. In 2003 education expenditure made up 16.2% of
all government spending. By 2008 this had shrunk back to 11.9%. Similarly, the
share of government spending on healthcare has steadily declined from a peak
of over 8% of total government spending in 1998 to a trough of 5.9% in 2008.
The latest estimate for 2010 puts the figure at 6.1% (World Bank 2013).
Concurrently, out-of-pocket spending on healthcare has steadily risen over the
1990s and 2000s (World Bank 2013). Such out-of-pocket spending on healthcare
represented around 48% of total spending on healthcare in 1995. By 2003 this
had risen to 61% and 58% in 2011 (World Bank 2013).
Revenue performance has also been unimpressive, especially the increased
reliance on non-tax revenue and domestic sales taxes over time. Overall tax
revenue performance has been particularly poor, remaining at around 15% of
GDP since 1999. According to recent IMF data, Egypt’s tax revenue performance
is below average, when compared to other lower middle income countries. In
fact only four out of 24 lower middle income countries had, on average, lower
tax (to GDP) ratios than Egypt9 (International Monetary Fund 2011). In its place
non-tax revenue has increased its share, due to an increased reliance on Suez
Canal receipts and mineral (natural gas) rents (Nashashibi 2002; Oxford
Business Group 2013).
Figure 3: Government revenue and expenditure as a per cent of GDP
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
9 Data are taken from Pessino and Fenochietto (2012).
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Additional evidence on fiscal changes in Egypt highlights the historic trend
away from direct tax collection, which is more progressive, towards a more
regressive indirect tax regime, focused on the collection of value-added and
sales taxes from consumers (Moore 2012). This is supported by considering the
share of taxation of goods and services,10 generally agreed to be more regressive
(Zolt and Bird 2005; Norregaard and Khan 2007), in total revenue in Egypt. Over
the period 1990–1997 such goods and services taxation represented, on average,
13.3% of all revenue collected. However, by 2011, this figure had almost doubled
to 25.2% despite revenue as a whole having declined as a percentage of GDP
over time (see Figure 3 and Table 5). The share of income, capital gains and
corporate taxation in total revenue has, on the other hand, increased only
marginally over the course of the 1990s and 2000s and remained 25% of total
revenue in 2010. Crucially, as a result of trade liberalisation since the 1980s,
receipts from trade-related taxes have reduced their share significantly since
1990 (Refaat 2000). By the IMF’s own admission, in the case of Egypt, the
authorities failed to recover the lost revenues from trade taxes (International
Monetary Fund 2005b).
A further regressive move was taken by the Egyptian government, under IMF
advice (International Monetary Fund 2005a) in 2005 to reduce the top marginal
tax rate on income and profits from 32% to 20% for individuals and from 40% to
20% for corporations and partnerships (International Monetary Fund 2011). The
rationale of such a move is summarised by the IMF, as follows:
While rate reductions would lower revenues in the short run, other measures introduced by
the legislation, notably the elimination of all exemptions and tax holidays, in addition to
the increase in prices of domestic energy products and electricity should offset this short-
fall. The law also introduces measures to expand the tax base, including through provi-
sions to encourage the informal economy to legalize its status. (International Monetary
Fund 2005a, 2)
However, such a policy has evidently not generated sufficient increases in
revenue to allow the Egyptian authorities to reverse the regressive expenditure
policies discussed above. A closer investigation of the composition of tax rev-
enues in Egypt demonstrates the shifting burden towards regressive indirect
taxation over direct taxation of incomes and profits since 1990. In Table 5,
indirect taxation in the form of taxes on goods and services had increased its
10 Taxes on goods and services include general sales and turnover or value-added taxes,
selective excises on goods, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use of goods or property,
taxes on extraction and production of minerals and profits of fiscal monopolies (World Bank
2013).
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share of total revenue from 16.3% in 1990 to 28.5% in 2005. By contrast more
progressive taxes on income, profits and capital gains have increased more
moderately from 23.1% in 1990 to 28.6% in 2010.
This pattern of increasingly regressive fiscal patterns is supported by other
studies of Egypt (Kienle 2004; El-Meehy 2009)
…comparing indirect taxes and welfare spending levels in relation to the GDP reveals a
trend towards inequity since the second half of the 1990s. (El-Meehy 2009, 109)
Given the structure of Egypt’s economic growth in recent years it is apparent that
fiscal policies over the 1990s and 2000s have done little to support a more
progressive economic system. Instead, the focus has been on curbing expendi-
ture with worrying reductions in education and health spending, in particular.
On the revenue side too little was done to support a more progressive taxation
system. Rather than supporting an equitable, progressive tax system, over time,
the silent majority of Egyptians have had to increase their contribution to
government revenue, often indirectly, via the levying of regressive sales taxes.
The food subsidies conundrum
With regard to subsidies in Egypt it is argued here that the ongoing debate over
the cost and poor targeting of subsidies (World Bank and Ministry of Economic
Development Arab Republic of Egypt 2007; Mohieddin 2010; Ramadan and
Thomas 2011) is a rather tangential one. Instead, the pertinent issue in relation
to consumer subsidies has been their use by Egyptian authorities to increasingly
appease the Egyptians masses, at the expense of providing them with appro-
priate employment opportunities. The decline in spending on subsidies and the
concurrent rise in food and energy costs over the 2000s helps to explain how
this part of the “social contract” broke down and fuelled the revolts of 2011. Had
Table 5: Egypt’s government revenue composition (1990–2010)
Percentage of total revenue 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Non-tax revenue 32.4% 35.4% 35.6% 32.6% 39.7%
Tax revenue (of which) 67.6% 64.6% 64.4% 67.4% 60.3%
Taxes on income, profits, & capital gains 23.1% 22.1% 24.7% 28.5% 28.6%
Taxes on goods and services 16.3% 17.3% 27.0% 28.4% 25.0%
Taxes on int’l. trade and transactions 16.5% 13.4% 12.5% 7.0% 5.5%
Other taxes 11.7% 11.8% 0.2% 3.6% 1.2%
Source: IMF 2013 (Government Financial Statistics).
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the Egyptian authorities, concurrently to reducing subsidy spending, focused on
raising the incomes of the majority of Egyptians via the creation of jobs, social
tensions may have been contained.
Many recent studies (World Bank 2009; World Bank and Ministry of Economic
Development Arab Republic of Egypt 2009; World Bank and Ministry of Finance
2009) have argued that social policies in general and the food subsidy system in
particular have been costly, regressive and poorly targeted. These studies contrast
the food subsidy bill of 2009 (which stood at 2% of GDP) to that of the late 1990s
(when it stood at below 1% of GDP) to underline what they believe to be the
unreasonably heavy fiscal burden of providing such subsidies. The food subsidy
system underwent dramatic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, with its total
costs being reduced from 14% of GDP in the early 1980s (Gutner 2002) to just 2%
of GDP today. These early reforms of the 1980s took place mainly at a time of
declining or stable world food and energy prices.
Mohieddin (2010) shows that the distribution of food subsidies has mostly
benefitted the better off. While the extreme, moderate and near poor received
only 38% of all food subsidies in 2006, the remaining 62% of subsidies went to
the better-off proportions of the population. In addition, a recent study (World
Bank and Ministry of Economic Development Arab Republic of Egypt 2009) has
suggested that urban areas have benefitted disproportionately from food sub-
sidies in Egypt. In per capita terms, benefits from food subsidies were around
10% higher in urban areas than in rural areas in 2008/09.
This negative picture can, however, be questioned. Evidently, without sub-
sidies, the poor, as well as a sizeable proportion of the non-poor population,
would have been appreciably worse off. The above World Bank co-authored
report acknowledges, for example, that “food subsidies lifted 9 percent of
Egyptians out of poverty in 2008/09” (World Bank and Ministry of Economic
Development, Arab Republic of Egypt 2010). An additional consideration is that
many Egyptian households have income levels just above the extreme poverty
line so food subsidies help those vulnerable to poverty as well as those already
suffering from it.11 One recent study considering the welfare effects of changes
to Egypt’s subsidy provisioning concludes that the impacts would be
11 In addition, the beneficial impact of food subsidies might be understated by referring to
changes in standard indicators of nutrition and human poverty. For example, Egyptian children
might no longer be recorded as being underweight but the nutritional content of their food
could have been significantly downgraded as a result of rising prices (see Sabry 2009). Food
insecurity has been a major problem in the Middle East in general, and in Egypt in particular.
This would have certainly adversely affected the poor but it would have also adversely affected
the real incomes of a much broader proportion of the population, contributing to thereby
stoking widespread popular discontent.
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widespread. Eliminating the baladi bread subsidy would in fact make all groups
of the population worse off (Ramadan and Thomas 2011).
Studying more recent data (see Figure 4) illustrates that the share of Egypt’s
budget devoted to both food and fuel subsidies has not kept pace, in fact, with
the rising trend in food and energy prices over this time.
Food subsidy coverage has historically been very broad in Egypt. Receiving such
a subsidy is regarded by many as an entitlement. It is therefore a politically very
sensitive issue (Gutner 1999). Some researchers have started to link the rising
cost of food across the Arab world directly to the recent political and social
uprisings (Lagi et al. 2011; Harrigan 2012). Historic lessons (see Gutner 1999)
suggest that previous political upheavals in Egypt have been closely associated
with exactly such developments, e.g. the regime-threatening 1977 bread riots.
There are evidently parallels between ongoing social tensions in Egypt and the
reduction in spending on subsidies since 2002.
The impact of reduced spending on subsidy provision has been particularly
harsh on a broad spectrum of the population in Egypt, precisely because this
process has occurred alongside a diminishing access to well-paid jobs.
Figure 4: Total food and fuel subsidies recorded on the budget in Egypt and food prices
Source: IMF, various years from IMF Article IV consultations and FAO (2013).
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In the absence of better paid jobs cuts in subsidies may, for instance, send numerous
“middle classers” tumbling down the poverty staircase. (Kienle 2013, 26)
The role of consumer subsidies in particular can act as a prism to understand the
ways in which the Mubarak regime clung on to power and managed to appease
the vast majority of Egyptians while concurrently diminishing their opportu-
nities for real economic enhancement through employment. The food subsidy
bill in Egypt began to rise in the early 2000s, long before food and fuel prices
rose (see Figure 4). This period coincided with increasing jobless growth in
Egypt. As such it demonstrates the failure of fiscal policies over the 2000s to
support growth in those sectors that could have provided Egyptian’s with stable
and secure employment.
While it is clear that food and fuel subsidies have played an important role
in preventing further increases in widespread poverty in the country, future
policies will need to complement such social protection with productive invest-
ment and strategic support to industries and sectors in which stable and secure
jobs are possible, including a new role for the public sector.
Policies that have promoted narrow investment
Investigating investment policies in Egypt can throw further light on the regressive
nature of policies adopted by the Egyptian government over the course of the
2000s, which in turn contributed to the narrow GDP growth detailed above. Many
of the concrete policy changes discussed below build on a broader debate and
discussion of the privatisation policies undertaken by the Egyptian authorities over
the 1980s and 1990s. These will not be delved into here but readers are referred to
a number of other studies that provide a detailed account of these processes and
their impacts (see Biygautane 2011; Harik and Sullivan 1992; Khattab 1999).
Data on gross fixed capital formation (World Bank 2013), a useful measure
of investment, show a gradual decline as a share of GDP from around 29% in the
1980s to 21% in 1990s and further to 19% in the 2000s. Since 2000, however, it
would appear that investment has increased modestly, from 17% of GDP in 2003
to 22% in 2008 before the global financial crisis (see Figure 5).
Dobronogov and Iqbal (2005), however, highlight that public investment in
Egypt has declined significantly over time. Public investment, according to
them, represented the majority of investment and remained above 15% of GDP
for much of the 1980s and early 1990s, before declining sharply to below 10% of
GDP for the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s. More recent data (The Arab
Republic of Egypt 2013) reveal a further dramatic decline from 5.2% in 1999/
2000 to just 2.9% in 2010/11 (see Figure 6). The reduction in public investment
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was targeted by Egyptian authorities under World Bank and IMF advice, in order
to reduce fiscal deficits in the short- to medium-term (World Bank 2005;
International Monetary Fund 2006).
The Egyptian authorities and the World Bank (2005) expected private invest-
ment to, at least partially, fill the gap left by the reduction in public investment.
This is especially the case since the Egyptian authorities reduced corporation and
income taxes significantly in 2005 and introduced various other tax exemptions
Figure 6: Public investment in Egypt as a per cent of GDP
Source: Arab Republic of Egypt 2013.
Figure 5: Gross fixed capital formation (per cent of GDP)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013.
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and incentives to private investors over the 2000s (Korshid et al. 2011).12 To some
extent, such a growth in private investment was in evidence for a short period in
the mid-2000s (see Figure 5). A brief glance at the Egyptian authorities’ own
documents (The Arab Republic of Egypt 2011, 2012; The Arab Republic of Egypt
2013) over the last 5 to 6 years also supports the perception of increased private
investment, particularly in the form of foreign direct investment.
However, Korshid et al. (2011) reveal that the sectors in which public
investment has declined have not attracted sufficient private sector investment
to plug the gaps.
In FY 2006/7, real public investment in electricity, education and health dropped by 20%,
13% and 35% respectively. This causes for an alarm as private sector investment is either
inexistent in the sector as in the case of electricity sector or it cannot be extended to cover
different income groups as in case of health and education sectors. (Korshid et al. 2011, 14)
Instead, private investment has been dominated by growth in petroleum-related
activities and has not generated sufficient or indeed skill-enhancing employ-
ment. Government statistics do not provide a sectoral breakdown of private
investment over time beyond the rudimentary categories of agriculture, industry
and services. Extrapolating information for the first quarter of 2011/12 (The Arab
Republic of Egypt 2012) reveals the breakdown given in Table 6. Evidently,
investment mainly flowed to the mining and petroleum-related sector (31.7%)
followed by the Suez canal-related activities (18.5). Agriculture, manufacturing,
Table 6: Sector breakdown of total investments (percentage shares)
Sector Share (%)
Agriculture 3.4
Manufacturing 12.1
Construction 1.3
Mining and Petroleum-related 31.7
Tourism 3.5
Comm. and Info. Technology 10.1
Suez Canal-related 18.5
Social Services 13.3
Trade 6.1
Total 100.0
Source: The Arab Republic of Egypt (2012).
12 Based on a number of reforms that have facilitated doing business in Egypt, the country has been
ranked the “Top Reformer” in the world for 3 years consecutively (2007–2009) by the World Bank’s
annual report “Doing Business” (World Bank, various years) – http://www.doingbusiness.org
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tourism and construction, all sectors that are traditionally employment inten-
sive, together only made up 20% of all investments in this period.
Looking at FDI flows, in particular, reveals an even more extreme trend
towards mining and petroleum-related investments. For the period 2004/05 to
2009/10, investments in this sector, on average, amounted to almost half (46%)
of all FDI flows (The Arab Republic of Egypt 2013).
The final note with regard to the nature of private investment in Egypt
relates to the lack of incentives and policies to foster relevant and widespread
employment generation. There is a clear mismatch between the levels of educa-
tion of labour market entrants and the types of jobs offered by new investments
in capital-intensive sectors. This problem was already in evidence in the late
1990s. Over this period there was a general trend towards employing more
capital-intensive technology in the manufacturing sector, with investment
biased against small- and micro-enterprises that typically used more labour-
intensive techniques (Fawzy 2002).
Investigating more recent data supports this trend. Intermittent monthly data
covering the period December 2008 to July 2013 indicates that the vast majority of
jobs created from new investments have been blue-collar jobs. For themonth of July
2013 the percentage of blue-collar jobs out of total new jobs created stood at 69.8%
(The Arab Republic of Egypt 2013). A further worrying trend is the creation of jobs
targeted explicitly at men. Across the last 5 years more than three quarters of new
investment-linked jobs have been labelled “male” jobs. In contrast only 2.7% of
jobs in July 2013 were explicitly labelled “female” jobs. Unfortunately, Egyptian
government policy over the 2000s did little to encourage new private investment
that was linked to appropriate employment creation for Egyptian men and women.
Turning back to the role of policy in facilitating private and public investment
it is apparent that Egypt’s investment performance could have been better, parti-
cularly given the apparent attractiveness of “doing business” in Egypt over the
last few years (World Bank 2010) and when compared to other lower middle
income countries (World Bank 2013). In particular, more private investment
could have been encouraged in productive industrial and services sectors where
there is an urgent need for job creation. It is therefore worth investigating what
other factors might have held back private investment in Egypt in the 2000s.
An obvious concern in relation to private investment-related policies is the
role of interest rates. Interest rates in Egypt have been pushed up over the 2000s
in an attempt to curb inflationary pressures, despite the causes of such inflation
most likely being structural (due to rising food prices) rather than monetary in
origin (Kandil 2011).13 Figure 7 highlights the general upward trend of treasury
13 The earlier discussion concerning subsidies is also relevant here (see Figure 4).
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bill rates, with particularly large increases in 2008 and again over the course of
2011.
While this trend is worrying, lending rates have more recently begun to
come down (International Monetary Fund 2013). The lack of access to credit in
Egypt, particularly for small- and medium-sized enterprises, has been a parti-
cular concern since the mid-2000s, as can be seen in Figure 8. There has been a
Figure 7: Treasury bill rates (January 2004–January 2013)
Source: IMF (2013).
Figure 8: Access to credit in Egypt (2000–2011)
Source: IMF (2013).
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clear decline in private sector credit provisioning since the early 2000s, with a
more dramatic decline since the global financial crisis in 2009.
A recent article (Herrera and Hurlin 2013) explains this reduction in private
sector lending by demonstrating the change in the sources of and uses of funds
by commercial banks in Egypt since 2005. Despite increased demand for credit
by the private sector, commercial banks have been investing in government
treasury bills instead. They have done so, partially because such bills are
deemed less risky (Abdel-Baki 2012) and because treasury bill rates have
increased in recent years. Treasury bill rates averaged 8.8% between January
1997 and December 2006. Between January 2010 and December 2012 average
rates had increased to 11.7% (International Monetary Fund 2013).
Since Egypt’s Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP)
under the World Bank and IMF involved the privatisation of many of Egypt’s
state-owned banks, alternative sources of funding for the private sector are
limited (Esam-Fayed 2013).
Conclusions
This paper set out to outline the economic policy challenges in Egypt today and
to demonstrate the probable contribution of particular economic policies to the
Egyptian political uprisings, via the erosion of employment opportunities, wages
and an increasingly inequitable economic structure in Egypt, supported by
regressive economic policies. The first part of the paper set out the economic
situation in Egypt over recent years. The second part considered more closely
the role of three particular policy areas in contributing to the general picture
described. Three critical areas were considered in turn: (i) fiscal consolidation
and the shifting regressive nature of tax collection efforts; (ii) the role of con-
sumer subsidies instead of employment-focused productive investments by the
state; and (iii) the lack of an employment-sensitive investment policy
framework.
An obvious question to emerge from the discussion in this paper is why
actors in Egypt are not proposing an alternative, more employment-focused
economic framework or why such a framework is not gathering support
among Egyptians? This is largely a political question, beyond the scope of this
paper. But what is clear is that without a clear break from previous economic
policies under Mubarak, many Egyptians remain dissatisfied and frustrated with
what the main political parties and alliances are offering in terms of economic
plans and policies. As long as the crucial underlying economic challenges
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outlined in this paper remain unaddressed, continued social and political unrest
seems a likely scenario going forwards.
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